Geopolitical dynamics and the microchip value chain
Navigating the United States-China rivalry
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.69895/g2dav916Keywords:
China, United Sates, Taiwan, microchips, technology competition, global value chainsAbstract
This article assessed the intensifying strategic rivalry between the United States (US) and China, with a focus on trade, technology, and the semiconductor sector as a critical arena of geopolitical competition. Drawing on international political economy and global value chain perspectives, the study traced the evolution of tensions from China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 to the escalation of the trade and technology wars since 2018. Special attention is given to Taiwan’s pivotal role as a leading producer of advanced microchips, a position that creates both strategic advantages and vulnerabilities in the global supply chain. The analysis employs trade data, policy documents, and regulatory measures to evaluate the impacts of tariffs, export controls, and industrial subsidies on global markets. A SWOT and TOWS framework is applied to assess the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats facing the semiconductor industry under current geopolitical conditions. The findings reveal persistent structural interdependencies despite political efforts at decoupling, underscoring the strategic dilemmas facing policymakers and industry stakeholders. The article concluded that the semiconductor sector is likely to remain a central domain of great power competition, with implications for economic resilience, technological innovation, and international security.
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Copyright (c) 2025 Ignacio Bartesaghi, Natalia Melgar (Author)
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