Políticas y Dilema de Alineamiento: Las causas del hedging en la competencia entre Estados Unidos y China en la infraestructura digital de América Latina

Autores/as

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.69895/yj5yv823

Palabras clave:

Rivalidad entre Potencias, Balance de Amenazas, Weaponized Interdependence, 5G, Centros de Datos, Economía Política Internacional

Resumen

¿Qué impulsa a los estados a revelar sus estrategias de alineamiento durante la competencia entre potencias? Basándonos en la teoría del balance de amenazas y la literatura sobre “hedging”, argumentamos que el desencadenante principal no es el ascenso de una potencia ni la rivalidad entre potencias, sino las Políticas Negativas de Alineamiento (NAS): el uso de presión económica o de seguridad por parte de una potencia para limitar la relación de un tercer estado con la potencia rival. Sostenemos que el NAS crea un Dilema de Alineamiento e impulsa a los estados a manifestar sus posiciones. Para probar esto, comparamos dos sectores en Brasil, Chile y México con una creciente presencia china: antenas 5G/4G y centros de datos. Donde estuvo presente el NAS, los países se alinearon explícitamente. Donde no estuvo presente, el hedging —si existió— permaneció pasivo u oculto. Nuestro articulo intenta contribuir a los debates sobre las causas del hedging al especificar un mecanismo que induce a los estados hacia estrategias activas de alineamiento. Pero esto plantea un problema adicional que denominamos Alineamiento Schrödinger: una condición en la que no está claro si un estado está siguiendo una estrategia de alineamiento oculta o ninguna estrategia en absoluto.

Biografía del autor/a

  • Joaquín Maquieira Alonzo, Fudan University

    Joaquín Maquieira-Alonzo es Doctorando en Relaciones Internacionales en Fudan University (Shanghái, China), donde investiga la geopolítica de la cadena de valor de los semiconductores, con énfasis en la competencia entre Estados Unidos y China y sus implicancias para la economía política internacional (EPI). Es Licenciado en Relaciones Internacionales por la UdelaR (tesis sobre plataformas digitales y EPI), Diplomado en Gobernanza de Internet por la Universidad de San Andrés y la UFRGS, y Magíster en Relaciones Internacionales por FLACSO Argentina (tesis sobre computación en la nube y EPI). En 2023 y 2024 co-diseñó y fue profesor de la materia Análisis de Plataformas Digitales en la Universidad Católica del Uruguay.

  • Cuihong Cai, Fudan University

    La Dra. Cuihong Cai es Profesora de Relaciones Internacionales en el Centro de Estudios Americanos de la Universidad de Fudan. Obtuvo su Licenciatura (1993) y Maestría (1996) en biofísica, y su Doctorado (2002) en Relaciones Internacionales en la Universidad de Fudan. Es autora de Cyber Governance in China: Balancing State Centrism and Collaborative Dynamics (Londres y Nueva York: Routledge, 2025); Cyber Politics in U.S.-China Relations (Singapur: World Scientific, 2021; Shanghái: Fudan University Press, 2019); Political Development in the Cyber Age (Pekín: Current Affairs Press, 2015); U.S. National Information Security Strategy (Shanghái: Academia Press, 2009); e Internet and International Politics (Shanghái: Academia Press, 2003), así como de más de un centenar de artículos y trabajos sobre política cibernética, estrategia de ciberseguridad, gobernanza del ciberespacio y relaciones entre China y Estados Unidos.

  • Brice Tseen Fu Lee, Fudan University

    Brice Tseen Fu Lee es Investigador Senior en la Universidad del Desarrollo, en el Centro de Estudios de Relaciones Internacionales. Posee un Doctorado en Política Internacional por la Universidad de Fudan, una Maestría en Política, Gobernanza y Políticas Públicas por la Universidad de Sheffield (como becario Chevening), una Maestría en Gestión y Tecnología por la Universiti Teknologi Brunei y una Licenciatura en Administración de Empresas por la Universiti Brunei Darussalam.

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Publicado

2025-09-15

Cómo citar

Políticas y Dilema de Alineamiento: Las causas del hedging en la competencia entre Estados Unidos y China en la infraestructura digital de América Latina. (2025). TongDao. Revista Latinoamericana De Estudios De China Contemporánea, 2(1). https://doi.org/10.69895/yj5yv823